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S U M M A R Y  
Economic evaluation of end of life care is increasingly expected from both research funders 
and those making decisions about the use of health and social care resources.  There are, 
however, difficulties in applying the currently established evaluative methods to end of life.  
These are partly associated with the sensitivity of the topic and the feasibility of data 
collection but also, more fundamentally, a lack of agreement about the terms in which such 
care should be evaluated.  This paper examines different theoretical perspectives from which 
economic evaluation of end of life care could be conducted, and argues for the application of 
a capability approach focusing on the opportunity for a good death.  It then examines 
challenges with taking forward such an approach, including defining, measuring and 
valuing appropriate outcomes.  It concludes that such an approach is viable, and explores 
how it might be taken forward to assist with resource allocation decisions.   
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I N T R O D U C T I O N :  C U R R E N T  P R O B L E M S  W I T H  
T H E  E C O N O M I C  E V A L U A T I O N  O F  E N D  O F  L I F E  
C A R E  
The evaluation of care strategies at the end of life is becoming increasingly important as, 
globally, the population of older people rises.  Increases in healthy life expectancy have not 
kept pace with improvements in total life expectancy and so the number of people in need of 
greater care at the end of life continues to rise.  Although policies to improve the quality of 
end of life care are being put in place in a number of countries [1-5], these inevitably have 
economic implications.  Some policies might involve potentially high costs for governments, 
health services and charities, as well as limits to unpaid care provision from families or 
through wider social networks, whilst others may be less costly, for example where highly 
technological expensive interventions are used more appropriately.  Indeed, recent work in 
the UK suggests high differences in costs associated with different models of end of life care 
[6].  The benefits associated with different policy options may also differ significantly and are 
equally important in thinking about resource allocation.  The evidence base for informing 
such resource allocation decisions is very small, however, with relatively few economic 
evaluations having been attempted; a recent systematic review of evidence on the cost and 
cost-effectiveness of palliative care, for example, found that just one out of 46 studies 
meeting the review inclusion criteria was a full cost-effectiveness study [7]. 
Nonetheless there is a clear desire for such evaluation to be conducted [1] and economists 
have started to discuss the issues involved, with a number of papers appearing in recent 
years about the difficulties associated with conducting economic evaluation at the end of life 
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[8-16].  These discussions focus on the methodological and ethical difficulties associated with 
the practicalities of conducting evaluations at a sensitive time within people’s lives. There is 
little agreement, however, on either the nature of the problems facing economic evaluation in 
end of life care, or methods for dealing with them.  A recent attempt to produce guidance for 
economic assessments of end of life care reflects this lack of consensus [17].  This guidance 
contained just three, relatively non-informative, items related to cost-effectiveness within the 
checklist (‘integrate into preliminary evaluations and test feasibility of methods’; ‘Collect 
data on use of services… to take societal approach to care costs’; and ‘justify appropriate 
outcome measures to generate cost-effectiveness’) and a section indicating ‘strongly 
opposing’ views about the appropriateness of using QALYs [17].   
It is clear that this lack of consensus on methods arises, at least in part, from more 
fundamental disagreements about the appropriate philosophical framework for conducting 
economic evaluation of interventions at the end of life [15] or, to put it another way, the 
different normative positions taken by economists working in this area.  Whilst the main 
focus of all normative economics is on what ‘should’ be done to achieve particular ends, 
what these ‘particular ends’ are is frequently unacknowledged and, in discussions of the 
evaluation of end of life care, seems to have become conflated with methodological issues. 
Not only does this cause confusion, but it also diverts from the very real, practical and 
methodological difficulties, some of which may be dealt with in a similar manner, even for 
those working in different paradigms.  Whilst any number of broad philosophical positions 
could be taken, three will be discussed here on the grounds that they are either currently 
extensively used in evaluation or are being actively developed both generally and in the 
context of end of life care.   
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The first, traditional, approach to welfare economics is welfarism.  Here, the aim of economic 
evaluation is to determine how to maximise utility within society [18-21] so as to provide 
information about efficiency (distributional issues are then left to the political system [20]).  
Utility is concerned with fulfilling desires [20] and can be seen as ‘a numerical representation 
of preferences’ (Hargreaves Heap [22], p.368).  Whilst it is assumed that individual utilities 
are not comparable, the notion of hypothetical compensation is utilised to ensure that 
decisions that have both losers and gainers can be evaluated [23].  The approach is generally, 
although not exclusively, operationalised through cost benefit analysis [24] in which utility 
benefits are estimated through individuals’ preferences in terms of willingness to pay.  The 
focus then becomes the values or preferences that individuals themselves bring to the 
decision and, in relation to end of life care, implies a focus on the preferences of those at the 
end of life as well as on the preferences of others affected by decisions.  One issue that may 
be particularly pertinent to welfarists concerns recent evidence that those at the end of life 
place a higher value on this period of time [25, 26].  This may be because the value of 
resources once dead is zero [27] and/or because people at this time wish to retain hope [27] 
and avoid ‘regret’ from not trying all possible options [28, 29].  This concern about the value 
of time to individuals at the end of life is then reflected by some economists working in 
economic evaluation of end of life, who view the summation of time gained from an 
intervention (adjusting for the value of quality of life experienced during that time) as 
problematic for the evaluation of palliative care interventions [9]. 
A second approach, and the one most commonly seen in current practice of economic 
evaluation across healthcare is the health maximisation approach, associated with one 
version of extra-welfarism [18, 19].  Here the emphasis is on maximising health, rather than 
utility [20], with health usually expressed through a particular interpretation of the Quality-
Adjusted Life-Year as a measure of health status valued by the general population [20].  In 
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this paradigm, end of life care is seen as just another form of health care that should be, 
largely, evaluated in the same way as all other conditions, with a maintained focus on 
whether end of life care produces gains in health [16].  An issue that currently exercises 
extra-welfarists of this persuasion, particularly in the UK, is the decision by the National 
Institute of Health and Care Excellence to apply a different threshold to (some of) those with 
end of life conditions.  This is perceived as unjustified [16] and is producing a growing 
literature exploring societal values on this issue [30-32].   
A third approach would be to take a broader extra-welfarist perspective.  In such an 
approach, the basic criteria of the extra-welfarist approach (going beyond utility in assessing 
outcome, not being restricted to individual preferences, allowing weighting of outcomes and 
explicitly allowing interpersonal comparison of outcomes [18]) would be met, but the 
broader approach might also relate to other philosophical criteria such as those associated 
with the capability approach advocated by Amartya Sen [33].  Such an approach is clearly 
less developed than other approaches, but may offer a promising way forward.   
This paper takes the position that it should be incumbent on all those conducting economic 
evaluation, but particularly those discussing methodology, to be clear about the underlying 
theoretical basis for their work.  Where methodological choices then derive directly from the 
underlying theoretical basis, critiques of the work should focus on that underlying 
theoretical basis and not on criticising the proposed methods as if they derive from a 
different basis.  (Of course, this should not preclude criticism of methodology that is poor in 
respect of its own theoretical base.)  For example, Round’s discussion of end of life care 
clearly derives from the theoretical basis of health maximisation [16], yet the paper makes 
numerous criticisms of the issues discussed, and approaches advocated, by both Coast and 
Lavender [34] and Normand [8], without acknowledging the different perspectives from 
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which these authors start their analysis.  Consequently, issues that are important from some 
perspectives are dismissed as irrelevant [16].     
Taking this position, the paper begins by setting out the broad principles from which it 
derives its philosophical basis.  It then provides an outline for a suggested approach for 
evaluation of end of life care based on the capability approach, before detailing some of the 
challenges in taking the methods forward as well as considering the potential for dealing 
with these methodological challenges.   
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C H O I C E  O F  U N D E R L Y I N G  P E R S P E C T I V E :  A N  
E X T R A - W E L F A R I S T  C A P A B I L I T Y  A P P R O A C H  
As indicated, there are three broad normative theoretical bases that economists are likely to 
choose from: welfarism; narrow extra-welfarism interpreted as health maximisation; or an 
alternative extra-welfarist perspective focusing on opportunity for a good death.  
Fundamentally, these differ according to their evaluative space – what it is that we are 
interested in evaluating – and indeed, by that definition of the evaluative space, who is 
included within that.  
A welfarist approach focusing on the utility (happiness or preferences) achieved by patients 
themselves at the end of life might seem entirely appropriate.  After all, it is patients and 
those close to them who directly experience the death, and therefore their preferences or 
values should be what ‘counts’ in decision making.  It is worth noting that in the welfarist 
cost benefit approach, costs and benefits to all are included, so these impacts on family and 
friends would be included within the analysis.  It also fits with policies to meet individuals’ 
preferences, for example, in relation to location of death [35].  There are two arguments that 
can be made against this philosophical position.  The first is that focusing just on utility may 
be too narrow and may miss other important aspects of care that cannot be measured in 
terms of utility or happiness [33].  Second, this approach seems inherently subject to, 
potentially significant, adaptation effects [36] as patients become gradually and 
progressively more limited by their condition or, more worryingly, in some cases 
accustomed to poor levels of care.   
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The standard extra-welfarist approach to end of life care would apply cost-effectiveness 
analysis to end of life care with interventions being chosen on the basis of maximising the 
Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) gained, where QALYs are a value-based measure of 
health status.  Applying standard health economics notions of maximising the total health 
benefit from interventions designed to provide supportive care at the end of life seems 
inappropriate given that, the objective of care at the end of life is not focused purely on 
health improvement [37-41].  Assessment of a good death seems unlikely to be fully captured 
for the dying person in terms of improvements in morbidity and/or mortality; it seems even 
less relevant to the loved ones of the dying person. There is some discussion as to whether 
those beyond the patient should be included within this approach; although the usual 
approach is to include only the patient, there are recent examples of decisions where the 
impact on family has been included [42].  For some working within this approach there is a 
clear imperative to include only the patient on the grounds that otherwise this may divert 
resources from patients without people who are close to them [16]; this can of course be seen 
as positive or negative.  There is also no element of the evaluation of choice in such an 
approach, where a service which enables individuals to opt for a dignified death without 
life-lengthening interventions would be evaluated as less beneficial (i.e. providing less in 
terms of gain in health) than one in which persons are automatically provided with life-
lengthening interventions, even where these are not wanted. 
An increasingly important approach to evaluation, particularly prevalent in the human 
development literature, is the capability approach [43], drawing on extensive work by 
Amartya Sen [33, 44, 45] and others [43, 46-50].  Sen focuses on the importance of evaluating 
interventions according to their impact on individuals’ ‘capability wellbeing’, that is, what a 
person is able to do or be in their lives.  Sen uses the example of a person who is starving due 
to lack of food compared with a person for whom food is freely available but who chooses to 
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fast, to illustrate why capability (ability to eat in this case), rather than functioning (having 
eaten), should be the important focus of evaluation [33].  A more relevant example in the case 
of end of life care might be two individuals, one living in an area where there is hospice 
provision and one where there is not.  The individual in the first area may not choose to use 
the hospice care available, preferring to receive care from family members; the second, who 
may not have family and would have used hospice care if it had been available would look 
the same as the first individual in terms of functioning (i.e. no hospice care received), but in 
terms of capability (ability to access hospice care) is clearly worse off.  An appropriate focus 
for the evaluation of end of life care might therefore be to consider different care strategies in 
terms of the capabilities that allow a person, and their family and friends, to have a good 
experience of end of life.  Such an approach would fit within the broader extra-welfarism 
described by Brouwer and colleagues [18].  This approach would focus on the important 
capabilities arising from supportive care provision but, because of the focus on capability 
rather than functioning, would allow for choice and the ability of people to decide 
themselves how to manage the end of their life.  The approach also suggests the inclusion of 
impacts on family and friends within the analysis given that their capability might also be 
affected.   
In line with many others from across a number of disciplines, this paper sees the capability 
approach as offering a valuable starting point for thinking about the analysis of end of life 
care, because of its different evaluative space.  This paper is therefore situated broadly within 
the extra-welfarist, capability approach and starts from the theoretical perspective that the 
appropriate focus for evaluation of end of life care is the opportunity for a good end of life 
experience.  Such a good end of life experience may require us to evaluate capability 
wellbeing for the person who is dying concurrently in terms of both quality of life and 
quality of death: in practice, the boundaries between living and dying are blurred, with 
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curative and palliative interventions often delivered concurrently [9, 51-53].  It may also 
require us to take account of family and loved ones [11, 12] who may experience significant 
social and economic burden [54] and at whom some caring interventions may be (jointly) 
targeted [55, 56], or who may experience a distressing bereavement if the death is sudden 
and there is no opportunity to say goodbye or make preparations.  It will also require us to 
consider how to value these different aspects of a good end of life experience, and how to use 
these in decision making.  Each of these is likely to be challenging, and the paper now 
considers these challenges.   
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C H A L L E N G E S  F O R  I M P R O V I N G  E C O N O M I C  
E V A L U A T I O N  O F  E N D  O F  L I F E  C A R E  W I T H I N  
T H I S  B R O A D  A P P R O A C H  
Challenge 1: Determining what capabilities are important to 
individuals at the end of life   
There is dissension among advocates of the capability approach about the extent to which 
different capabilities should be considered in different evaluations.  Nussbaum recommends 
developing a single set of capabilities that are important in all situations [46], whilst  Sen and 
his supporters indicate that they do not endorse the approach of a single list [49, 57, 58], with 
Alkire suggesting that “no one set will do for every evaluation” (Alkire, p.119 [47]).  This 
paper takes the latter view, that the evaluation of different sets of capabilities may be 
important in different broad contexts.  Although the capability approach is starting to make 
inroads into the economic evaluation of health care interventions, just one of a number of 
challenges for end of life care is that, although tools are starting to become available (indices 
such as ICECAP-O [59-61], ICECAP-A [62-64], Oxcap-MH[65]) for measuring and valuing 
capability, they concentrate on capability wellbeing in relation to a ‘good life’ rather than a 
‘good death’.  
A focus entirely on health alone has already been rejected; although there may be important 
health-related capabilities around reducing physical discomfort, there may be other 
important capabilities arising from end of life care that cannot be measured in terms of 
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health.  Those faced with imminent death may define wellbeing differently from healthy 
individuals, and health status itself may assume less relevance than, for example, spiritual 
dimensions or preparation for death.  Factors such as the ability to prepare for death [38, 39, 
66], to receive spiritual comfort [38], to be treated with dignity and respect [41], to influence 
the care received [37-39, 41] to receive love and support [37, 40] without feeling oneself to be 
a burden on others [37, 41] and to achieve a sense of completion in life [38, 39] may become 
important in assessing capability wellbeing at the end of life, in addition to issues such as 
pain and symptom management [37-39, 41].  Until recently, the measures available for use 
with patients at the end-of-life [67] have not been helpful for use in a capability approach to 
resource allocation/economic evaluation as they are too long to easily attach values to, 
and/or are insufficiently generic (for example focusing on cancer patients alone).  
Recent research, however, has aimed to find out what capabilities are important to people in 
terms of end of life care [68, 69].  In-depth interviews were conducted with twenty-three 
older people: older people in the general population; those living in residential care; and 
those receiving palliative care.  There are clearly concerns about potential adaptation to 
poorer situations by those approaching the end of life, particularly where the care provided 
is poor. Equally, however, people’s feelings about what is important to them at the end of life 
may change in unforeseen ways with that experience.  It was therefore seen to be important 
in finding out about important attributes of end of life care to include those at various points 
along the trajectory towards death.  Interviews covered what informants believe to be 
important about end of life care, dying and death  [14, 68, 69].  Interviews were analysed 
using constant comparative methods to develop conceptual attributes of importance for a 
measure of a good death; repeat interviews were conducted with twelve informants to check 
conceptual attributes and develop wording for the measure.  From these interviews, a 
descriptive measure, referred to as the ICECAP Supportive Care Measure, or ICECAP-SCM 
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has been developed [69].  The measure has seven attributes based on what people felt was 
important to them: autonomy, love, freedom from physical suffering, freedom from 
emotional suffering, dignity, support and preparation.  Each attribute is expressed in terms 
of capabilities and described by one of four levels ranging from full capability, through some 
capability and a little capability, to no capability, with these levels expressed in terms of time 
rather than severity.  Examples of the types of descriptive statements are: ‘I can make decisions 
that I need to make about my life and care some of the time’; ‘If I want to, I can be with people who care 
about me most of the time’; ‘I am able to have the help and support that I need only a little of the time’; 
‘I have not had the opportunity to make any of the preparations I want to make’ [69].  This measure 
may provide an appropriate way forward for meeting the challenge of measuring the 
benefits of end of life care in terms of capability associated with a good death, but clearly, as 
with all measures, information is required about the validity, reliability, sensitivity to change 
and acceptability of the ICECAP-SCM.  This is particularly the case given that one limitation 
of the measure is that it was generated with older people.   
The question of whether life itself (one of the fundamental capabilities within Nussbaum’s 
taxonomy [46]) is an important element of a good death is a further challenging issue.  For 
the ICECAP-O [59, 60] and ICECAP-A [62, 64] measures (generic measures of capability 
wellbeing), life can be captured in that a person who has died has no capability and their loss 
of wellbeing through loss of life can be assessed accordingly.  It is also possible to estimate 
gains in years of full capability equivalence by adjusting the ICECAP instruments for time 
[64].  For a good death, however, death itself may not imply a loss of capability, but the 
timing and nature of dying may instead be an integral element of the dying person’s 
capability.  This suggests a fundamental rethink is required in how to account for time 
within the approach, which may be akin to valuing pathways of care as suggested by 
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Normand [9] (albeit that his work is more focused on utility maximisation) or may require 
time spent in the end of life period to be considered directly as an element of a good death.   
The issue of capturing benefits to family, friends and loved ones – hereafter referred to as 
‘close persons’ – is equally, if not more, challenging.  There are similar issues in relation to 
methods for capturing capabilities for close persons in relation to end of life care, although 
the capabilities themselves are likely to differ.  There are also, however, questions about 
precisely whose capabilities should be captured, suggesting the importance of 
understanding the social networks around those who are at the end of life [70].   
Participatory empirical work could be used to explore the important aspects of capability 
wellbeing for close persons.  Again, it will be important in such work to capture perspectives 
from close persons where patients are at different points in the dying trajectory and during 
the bereavement period, where patients have different trajectories towards death (including 
trajectories associated with sudden death, terminal illness, organ failure and following frailty 
and decline including dementia) [71, 72], in contexts with differing end of life provision [1] 
and where there are differing family dynamics.  This will enable the influence of any 
adaptation to poorer states to be captured, as well as providing sufficient variation of 
experience to be sure that all important aspects of capability wellbeing are captured.  The 
extent to which a close person’s capability is enhanced through doing their best to provide a 
good death for their loved one, despite losses in their own personal wellbeing (known as 
‘agency’ [33] within the capability literature) may also be important to ascertain.   
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Challenge 2: Measuring capabilities at the end of life 
It is one thing to determine what capabilities are important at the end of life, and another to 
determine how they should be measured.  There are a number of important issues both in 
terms of the extent to which the different options are consistent with the capability approach 
and in terms of their feasibility in an ethically sensitive area.  This section focuses primarily 
on measurement of capability in relation to end of life care for the dying individual, rather 
than for the individual’s loved ones, but, again, many of the issues are similar across the two 
areas of focus.   
A particularly difficult issue in assessing capability wellbeing for people at the end of life is 
who should do this measurement.   One option would be that individuals themselves could 
indicate their own level of capability wellbeing, for example using an instrument such as the 
ICECAP-SCM [69].  An advantage of this sort of self-assessment is that individuals 
themselves hold the greatest level of information about their own capabilities, particularly 
perhaps when they have a capability that they choose not to pursue in terms of function.  A 
disadvantage is that individuals who have, for example, received poor care, particularly if 
over a long period, may have adapted to this poor state.  Their measures may be affected as a 
result.   Evidence of such adaptation might be obtained if those on a long downward 
trajectory towards death are compared with those on a much shorter trajectory.  If the former 
have a tendency to rate what appear to be similar or worse situations more highly than the 
latter, this might provide evidence of adaptation.  Similarly, if those in receipt of much 
poorer care were to rate their care in a similar way to those receiving much better care, this 
might also provide evidence of adaptation.  The difficulty with such analyses, of course, is 
having some clear objective measure of poor and good care that can be used to make such 
assessments.   
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If measures are to be completed by others, who should these others be, and would their 
assessment necessarily be more ‘objective’? A family member may have witnessed a ‘good’ 
death for their loved one but if they have also experienced significant caring burden 
themselves, their assessment of the death of the patient may be affected by their own 
perspective; distress about the illness and death itself may also influence their perceptions 
about the dying person’s capabilities.  Similarly, health care professionals’ assessments may 
be affected by factors such as whether the patient is compliant.  Among both family members 
and health care professionals, there may be a lack of awareness about whether the patient 
really did or did not experience particular capability wellbeing levels.  This may be of 
particular importance in relation to aspects such as emotional suffering, where patients may 
have gone to great lengths to hide their feelings, especially from loved ones.   
There are also issues about the feasibility of completion by different groups.  Those at the 
end of life may suffer from fatigue and pain, making them reluctant to complete measures; at 
times they may be physically unable to do so.  Clearly it is also impossible for dying 
individuals to evaluate their care in retrospect.  It may be difficult to ask families about the 
death of their loved one until a particular interval has passed following bereavement; by this 
time, families themselves may have adapted to, or rationalised, any issues around the death 
of their loved one.  Health care professionals are often very busy; and different health 
professionals may have experience of different aspects of care for an individual, without any 
one professional having a full picture.  For example, if a patient’s pain is well controlled 
during the day but not at night, the nurses on duty at these different times may have very 
different views of a patient’s capability wellbeing, in terms of their freedom from physical 
suffering.  Further, some individuals may not be receiving (extensive) care from health 
professionals, and there may therefore be no such person who can provide such information.   
18 
Such issues clearly need further exploration.  It may be that the most objective assessment of 
whether a person has had high or low levels of capability wellbeing at the end of life is 
through a combination of these different assessments, but this generates further issues 
around the combining of different views, and requires an explicit understanding that 
measures completed by different individuals are unlikely to be interchangeable.  The validity 
and reliability of any such attempts to combine across sources of measurement also need 
exploration. 
 
Challenge 3: Valuing capabilities at the end of life  
There is then the important methodological question of how to weight end of life capabilities, 
as for example captured in instruments such as the ICECAP-SCM, so that they are helpful for 
use in resource allocation decision making.  In principle, the methods for valuation should be 
‘done with critical examination, with self-scrutiny, and where relevant, involve the discipline 
of public reasoning’ (Sen,p.94  [73]), but in practice it remains unclear as to how such 
valuations should be achieved [49].  
Given the critique of individual mental states of preferences as an indicator of capability 
wellbeing, it would be problematic for the capability approach to then rely on personal 
preferences regarding capabilities.  This suggests that weighting or valuation should not, 
therefore, be undertaken by individuals themselves given the concerns within the capability 
approach about the distorting impact of adaptation.   Drawing on Cookson’s arguments [74], 
general population values might be assessed instead, as utilised for the generic ICECAP 
measures [60, 64].  Such general population values may be used to provide at least a starting 
point for generating a standard set of values for use in decision making [74], reducing the 
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potential for including adaptive effects.  On the other hand, end of life care is perhaps unique 
in that (unlike, for example, poverty, or poor health) each individual experiences the end of 
their life on only one occasion.  There may be genuine changes in what is important to a 
person at this point in their lives that are not just related to adaptation to a poor situation, 
but that represent a true difference in what is valued when death is imminent and when an 
individual has only a short time remaining.  The general population then may have only a 
limited grasp of such altered values.  This suggests that there does in fact need to be some 
attempt to find out about the values of those at the end of life.  
As well as theoretical issues about the appropriateness of using values obtained from 
different groups, there are also issues of feasibility to contend with.  Amongst the general 
population, for example, there may be difficulties in valuing aspects of capability wellbeing 
by those who may have little or no experience of important attributes of capability wellbeing 
at the end of life (for example, being able to prepare for death) in the context of their own 
death or those of loved ones.   Values may thus be very hypothetical even where there are 
very good descriptions of attributes within the valuation exercise.  For those at the end of 
life, the feasibility issues are likely to be considerably greater.  Those at the end of life may 
not wish to be burdened with providing capability wellbeing values, and perhaps even more 
importantly, the professional gatekeepers acting as advocates for their patients may be 
unwilling to facilitate access to them for such purposes.  Where access is obtained, 
researchers may need to be particularly aware of the importance of minimising burden by 
having both cognitively undemanding tasks, and short tasks that will not excessively tire 
individuals.  One such method may be best-worst scaling [75] which has been used 
previously in the valuation of ICECAP-O and ICECAP-A and which seems to be less 
cognitively demanding than other techniques for understanding values.   The method 
generates an interval scale and information about the relative value of changes in wellbeing 
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is measured between 1 (full capability) and 0 (no capability) [60].  Even this relatively brief 
and simple task, however, may be perceived as excessively burdensome by individuals, by 
health professionals acting as ‘gatekeepers’, and by ethics committees.  A further alternative 
that remains largely unexplored would be to obtain values from health and care 
professionals as individuals who through their experience understand the important 
capabilities for those at the end of life.   
The potential for deliberative roles within the valuation of capability indices remains an 
important area for future research.  Given that there may be more difficulty in utilising 
Cookson’s arguments [74] for capability at the end of life, it may be that there are stronger 
incentives in this area to test a more deliberative approach.    
 
Challenge 4: Using end of life capabilities in decision making  
All current health economics approaches have retained a maximisation principle as the basis 
for decision making. An important aspect of the capability approach however is that it does 
not accept that policy making should be based on a single principle: “… no one principle – 
for example, efficiency maximisation – suffices for normative economic problems.  Rather, a 
plurality, not only of informational ingredients, but also of combining principles, should be 
considered” (Alkire, p.124 [47]).  In relation to end-of-life care in particular, the notion of 
maximising total capability no matter to whom it accrues may make less sense than other 
possible decision rules.  Other rules, for example, might include the notion of maximising the 
number of people who experience a (sufficiently) good death, or improving the lot of those 
who currently have the worst experiences.   
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A concern with distributive justice may, indeed, suggest that in allocating resources, it is 
particularly important to increase the proportion of individuals reaching a minimum 
threshold of capability wellbeing [76].  Indeed, ‘Nussbaum passionately advocates that 
people all over the world should be entitled, as a matter of justice, to threshold levels of all 
the capabilities on her list…’ (Robeyns, p.115 [77]).  One option for evaluating the 
distributional element of the provision of a ‘good death’ would, therefore, be to utilise and 
adapt the sorts of multi-dimensional poverty measures developed by Alkire and Foster [78] 
(where poverty here relates to poverty in terms of capability wellbeing) which use this 
notion of a threshold value beyond which an individual can be considered to be in poverty.  
One could argue, for example, that for a minimally acceptable death all people should have 
at least a little capability for each of the seven attributes within the ICECAP-SCM, and that 
policies that move people from having no capability to a little capability should be prioritised 
over those that move individuals from a little capability to points higher up the scale.   
Participatory approaches could be used to explore the issue of what combining rules are 
advocated by the population generally and whether the maximisation of total benefit no 
matter to whom it accrues (as in a standard QALY-type analysis) is seen as acceptable in the 
context of end of life.  Such participatory approaches are likely to be most successful where 
there are opportunities to reflect and respond to the views of others, to debate issues and 
understand points of difference.  The use of focus groups is likely to be particularly 
advantageous in such participatory approaches.  For such approaches to be successful, 
however, it is important that discussions are not too abstract, and that those involved can see 
the implications of different combining rules for the actual allocation of resources. 
This discussion has focused on decision making in the abstract, but of course, it will need to 
be tied into the structures for end of life care provision in different countries, systems and 
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settings.  Even in countries with single provider health systems, such as the UK, end of life 
care is provided through a variety of providers, including the health and social care systems 
and a large number of charitable funders.  This makes the decision setting somewhat 
different to the setting for publicly funded health care, and may mean that both different 
priorities and different decision rules may be appropriate.   Particularly problematic is that 
some decision makers, for example in the health sector, may have to weigh the benefits of 
investing in end of life care against other calls on their budgets, whilst others, for example in 
the charitable funding sector, may be more concerned about decisions between alternative 
forms of care provision.   
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E X P E R T  C O M M E N T A R Y  
The paper began by focusing on the important question of what actually is to be achieved 
through the use of economic evaluation, and argued for the use of a capability approach in 
evaluating end of life care.  It then focused on the many research challenges that arise.  The 
paper sought to categorise and describe these challenges, which range from questions about 
what precisely should be measured and valued, to questions about how such information 
should be utilised in decision making.  It is clear that those addressing the problem of 
economic evaluation from a welfarist or a narrowly health-focused extra-welfarist 
perspective will each face some of the issues discussed here, but not all of them.  For 
example, researchers working within all three perspectives may have concerns about the 
feasibility of obtaining information from those at the end of life.  Some issues, however, are 
particularly pertinent within the capability approach, for example, the concern with trying to 
avoid adaptation impacting on assessment, but are not (as) relevant to other perspectives.   
Of course, there are other challenges that have not been considered here in such depth.  One 
is the question of how to determine whether a person is at the end of life.  This is clearly of 
fundamental importance if a different form of evaluation is proposed for those at this stage 
of life.  End of life could be defined in terms of the health care process – by diagnosis or 
prognosis – or by the person themselves through, for example, decisions to discontinue 
curative treatment.  For many patients, however, there may not be a clear terminal diagnosis, 
and although dying patients may be defined retrospectively (and for sudden death this may 
be unavoidable), for prospectively evaluating capability wellbeing, this is unhelpful.  One 
option is the expectation by professionals of a particular life-expectancy (using an assessment 
of whether a clinician would be ‘surprised’ if a person were to die within the next 12 months) 
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[79]; this method is sometimes used for putting in place end of life services and so seems to 
offer some potential, but evidence for its use is poor.  
Both the provision of end of life care, and the economic assessment of policies and 
interventions at the end of life are becoming acknowledged areas of policy relevance and 
there is a growing understanding that the tools for economic assessment are currently 
lacking and that the whole area is under-researched.  The capability approach potentially 
offers a more comprehensive approach to economic evaluation of end of life care and tools 
for use within the approach are starting to be developed [69].  It is not yet clear what the 
support for the use of the capability approach in this context will be, but it is worth noting 
that in the evaluation of social care more generally in the UK, there has been institutional 
support from both the Social Care Institute for Excellence [80] and the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence [81] for the use of measures developed within a capability 
approach.  This offers some hope that a broader perspective than that of health alone might 
be considered equally important for the evaluation of end of life care; the level of support 
will, of course, influence both the funding and the practical support that will enable 
progress.   
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F I V E  Y E A R  V I E W  
Despite some recent signs of improvement, many countries are still facing pressures on 
budgets for areas such as health and social care; these are anticipated to remain for the 
foreseeable future.  The requirement to show value for money in such spending is thus only 
likely to increase.  In relation to end of life care an increasing insistence on rigorous 
evaluation both of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of interventions and care can be 
expected, and to achieve this, it is vital that the economic tools available are fit for purpose.   
Some countries, where the focus is already broader than that found in the cost/QALY 
approach, may already have sympathy with the approach outlined here.  Even in countries 
such as the UK, where the cost/QALY approach has been dominant in recent years, there is 
starting to be an acknowledgement that health maximisation as an objective even within 
health care interventions may be insufficient.  In the UK this is expressed through the 
discussions around value based pricing which have considered a greater focus, for example, 
on carers and productivity [82].  A broader perspective on economic evaluation of end of life 
care may become increasingly acceptable over the next five years.  The recent provision of 
EU funding specifically to tackle some of these research issues in relation to a capability 
approach to resource allocation at the end of life through the EconEndLife project, already 
suggests some support for the approach amongst research funders.   
In the coming years, it is likely that there will be both methodological development within 
the economic evaluation of care at the end of life, and also more conduct of such evaluations.  
This will offer the opportunity to further develop methods within the context of ongoing 
evaluations – essentially, trying things out in practice, and finding out what does, and does 
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not, work.  It also offers the opportunity to work closely with palliative care researchers to 
generate common approaches to evaluation.  The EconEndLife project expects to report on a 
number of areas discussed in this paper in the coming years including: feasibility of asking 
end of life patients, close persons and health professionals to complete capability measures; 
values for the ICECAP-SCM; important attributes to capture in a measure for close persons; 
extent of the social network that should be captured by measures for close persons; and the 
use of such capability measures in decision making.  Other research that might be important 
from this perspective includes explicitly examining whether measures are appropriate and 
valid across different age groups and those with different conditions.   
In practice, taking forward the challenges outlined here requires both creativity and funding, 
but the rewards are potentially high, and even some advances over the next five years could 
radically change how we approach economic evaluation of interventions at the end of life by 
the end of this period. 
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K E Y  I S S U E S  
 Economic evaluation can be conducted from three main philosophical perspectives: 
welfarism; narrow extra-welfarism using the cost/QALY approach; a broader extra-
welfarism often associated with Amartya Sen’s capability approach. 
 There are many methodological challenges associated with the evaluation of end of 
life care, associated with defining, measuring and valuing appropriate outcomes. 
 The perception of the methodological challenges differs according to the 
philosophical perspective and the paper argues that such perspectives should be 
made clear in critiques of methodology. 
 The paper argues for a philosophical perspective based on the capability approach, 
with the opportunity for a good death for both the dying person and the persons 
close to them as an appropriate outcome. 
 The ICECAP Supportive Care Measure is the first outcome measure to define the 
outcome for the dying person in line with this philosophical approach and offers a 
way forward, but evidence about its validity is still required; work is also required on 
the important outcomes for the dying person’s family and friends. 
 One challenge in measuring capability at the end of life is to determine who should 
complete measures and better understanding the benefits and disbenefits of 
completion by different stakeholders 
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 Another challenge is to establish how to value capability measures, whose values are 
appropriate and how feasible and meaningful such values are. 
 A final challenge is to incorporate such measures in decision making.   
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